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Conflicts have existed for generations worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts occur for various 
reasons, including inter-tribal or clanist tensions, resource disputes, and externally instigated wars. These 
conflicts may persist unabated for generations, and can take on different dimensions. When a major 
conflict breaks out in one country, refugees often move in search of security and basic services (including 
food), creating major spill-overs that affect the entire region, placing considerable strain on local 
capacities to manage the food and nutrition needs of local populations and refugees. A sizeable proportion 
of the land making up sub-Saharan Africa is arid or semi-arid, rendering it unable to sustain livelihoods in 
any meaningful manner. Furthermore, this region often suffers from political turmoil and poor governance 
practices. This paper focuses on East Africa, a region that suffers from political, economic and 
environmental fragility. Few previous papers have examined the detrimental interactions between conflict 
and economic policy (as represented by reduced resources and limited organizational capacity for public 
services) in Sub-Saharan Africa nor have many studies examined the traditional coping strategies that sub-
Saharan communities may use to resolve conflict. This paper attempts to describe the underlying reasons 
for the repeated hunger crises on the African continent, particularly in East Africa, followed by a brief 
analysis of additional factors that may exacerbate such emergencies. One key question is: What can be 
done to prevent these types of situations, and why haven’t we found a lasting solution? It seems that these 
problems and their lack of management are largely due to policy failures and lack of political will. In 
regions of the world that experience earthquakes, hurricanes and typhoons (Africa does not), help may be 
obtained from outside the country, but the national governments themselves oversee the reconstruction 
and recovery aspects. In East Africa, in contrast, external assistance is required not only for the immediate 
disaster response, but also for subsequent development and reconstruction. Why don’t governments in this 
region prepare for these nearly annual events? Furthermore, given that this is an insecure region, why 
don’t the governments enact measures aimed at maintaining peace and security, which are necessary for 
effective development? One means to ensure peace and security in this troubled region is through 
strategies aimed at enhancing food productivity and access. Furthermore, good governance based on 
democratic representation of all citizens is key to preventing poverty, hunger, malnutrition, disease and 
conflict, leading to the attainment of harmony and balance in society.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
With high food prices threatening the food security of millions of vulnerable households around the 
world, hunger and malnutrition are back in the headlines. The world is making only slow progress in 
reducing food insecurity, according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI). Some regions—in particular 
South and Southeast Asia, the Near East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean—have 
made significant headway in combating hunger and malnutrition since 1990, but in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, the GHI remains high. Moreover, progress in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 has been 
marginal (von Grebmer et al. 2008). 
The focus of this paper is East Africa, which falls within the Greater Horn of Africa, an area that 
is known for its political insecurity, refugee movement, food scarcity and illegal commerce of small arms 
and weapons. The East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental organization comprising the 
five East African countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The EAC was originally 
founded in 1967, collapsed in 1977 (giving rise to celebration in Kenya), and was officially revived on 7 
July 2000. In 2008, the EAC, after negotiations with the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), agreed to an expanded 
free trade area that includes the member states of all three organizations. The combined population of 
East Africa is 126.2 million, meaning that these expanded trade opportunities should help enhance 
potential outcomes in East Africa ( http://www.eac.int/)EAC Website accessed September 2009). 
Figure 1. Map of Africa showing the Eastern African countries 
 
Source: http://www.computers4africa.org/impact/eastafrica.htm 2 
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Source: FEWS NET June 2009 
Note: Based on the latest assessment and monitoring data, as well as baseline data and analysis 3 
 
This paper is based in part on information surrounding the skirmishes that followed a flawed 
December 2007 general election process in Kenya (UNICEF 2008, KCHR 2008). This was a clearly man-
made emergency that was largely unexpected. Within a week of the first violent outbreak the conflict was 
already being described as a Rwanda-like situation, referring to the 1994 Rwandan civil war that resulted 
in the slaughter of nearly one million people. This was not the first such violence in Kenya, and other East 
African countries (e.g., Uganda and Burundi) have had their own crises in recent years. The post-election 
skirmishes, however, were distinguished by their timing, scale and the fact that international mediation 
was required. The questions that we examine against this backdrop of man-made crisis are: When will 




2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Conflicts have existed worldwide for generations and persist through the present day, with some known 
trouble spots rarely experiencing peace for any length of time. This paper concentrates on conflicts and 
their possible association with food/ nutrition emergencies in Africa, with a particular focus on East 
Africa. In this region, conflicts may occur for a variety of reasons, ranging from inter-tribal resource 
competition to externally instigated wars.  
The three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania came together in 1971 to form 
the East African Community as an economic block with headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania while Rwanda 
and Burundi joined them later. East Africa lies in the Greater Horn of Africa, which is considered a 
conflict hot spot; once a major conflict breaks out in one country of the region, there is a major spill-over 
to the rest of the region. This affects basic services and has human-rights implications for both settled and 
refugee populations. Because of the region’s vulnerability to conflict, there seems to be continuous 
movement of people from country to country in search of physical security, food, water, and grazing 
pastures. This type of movement puts considerable strain on a region that is already environmentally, 
economically and demographically unstable. Numerous reports examining the political and economic 
factors that appear to spark conflict have concluded that governance in sub-Saharan Africa in general (and 
East Africa in particular) must be improved in order to realize any meaningful development in the region 
especially from agriculture (Urbach and Sacks 2009, Sacks 2009). As environmental awareness has 
increased in recent years, it has become clear that we must also address the consequences of conflict on 
Africa’s increasingly fragile environment, which is a critical component of the region’s food production 
and distribution systems, as well as local human capacities. Literature has examined the unsettling events 
in East Africa and surrounding areas that culminate in hunger, itinerancy and various forms of human 
suffering (FEWS NET 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009). The world press is quick to show us pictures of starving 
children and emaciated adults huddling in camps or moving to safety. However, few reports have 
empirically examined the consequences of the detrimental interactions between conflict and economic 
policy, represented by reduced resources, a deteriorating environment and limited organizational capacity 
for public services (DFID 2005). 
Beginning in the mid 1980’s, food insecurity and hunger in sub-Saharan Africa was recognized as 
a cyclical issue that could be predicted as coming approximately every five years, particularly in East 
Africa. In addition, the region contains arid and semi-arid areas, some of which can go for as long as four 
years without a drop of rain. Historically, food insecurity and hunger have gone hand in hand with 
conflict, to the extent that it is difficult to determine the cause-effect relationship of the two with any 
degree of certainty. Does perpetual hunger and harsh environmental conditions drive people to violence 
or does unabated conflict lead to limited food production and activities that threaten the environment, or 
are both scenarios in play? Moreover, to what extent does bad governance and feelings of neglect drive 
populations to acts of war and resentment against their political leaders, thus causing people to move 
away from productive activities? Furthermore, although the concept of “climate change” is fairly recent, 
the effects of climate change have affected populations in East Africa for generations, with devastating 
impacts seen in the arid and semi-arid areas.  
In East Africa, conflicts are often associated with politics and leadership issues, as seen in the 
early kingdom wars of Uganda, the political upheavals in Uganda (during the Amin days), Kenya (during 
the Mau Mau fights for independence in the 1950’s) and Tanzania (against the Germans for 
independence), and the more recent conflicts between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. 
Much more recently, there has been post-election violence in Kenya and civil strife in neighboring Sudan, 
Somali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The negative effects of these conflicts have spilled over 
into other parts of the region in the form of refugees and the supply of illegal arms to local (Twaddle and 
Currey1993). Furthermore, terrorist attacks occurred in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and in neighboring 
Somalia on June 18, 2009. All these unsettling events affect people’s livelihoods through insufficient 5 
 
food production, increased morbidity and mortality, limited wealth creation, and decreased contribution to 
national development. These emerging issues cannot be addressed in a policy vacuum, or in an 
environment where many citizens feel neglected by the government and are not assured of basic services 
(e.g., justice). In these cases, individuals may worry more about their survival “today” than that during a 
“tomorrow” they are not assured of seeing. Thus, we must seek to improve governance and encourage 
policy makers to address the population’s current needs, plan unselfishly for future generations, and work 
for the greater good.  
Food insecurity in East Africa seems to have a multi-pronged causality. Political instability, wars 
and internal conflict constitute one set of problems. The uncertain climate and fragile ecology, which 
make it difficult to house and feed refugees and internally displaced persons present another set of 
challenges. Additional challenges emerge as situations worsen (Ulrich 2006, UNSa 2008). Here, we 
attempt to shed light on the interconnections among the various causal factors.  
Food emergencies continue especially in this region of Africa (Figure 2). Many argue that so long 
as resources are not shared equitably, there can never be peace. Have historical conflicts been rooted in 
unfair resource allocation? The failure of leaders to follow fair and just practices amounts to bad 
governance. Moreover, the region is characterized by a harsh ecological environment, with arid or semi-
arid land, little water, and limited grazing. Drought normally affects East Africa every five years or so, 
although many observers have reported more frequent drought events in recent years due to climate 
change (IGAD 2002).  
There is no doubt that one of the ways to ensure peace and security in this troubled region is for 
policy makers to enact strategies aimed at enhancing food productivity, access and utilization. 
 6 
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3.  AFRICA’S DISEQUILIBRIUM  
Three main underlying factors disorganize communities in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in disharmony 
among the various populations in the region; these three factors are political, economic and environmental 
problems. Once disequilibrium is created, it spirals to both expected and unexpected consequences. These 
complex issues are broadly summarized below as dimensions that could be either causal or effects or both 
of disequilibrium. 
Political Dimensions 
Politics and Food Security 
Probably the single most notable cause of famine and hunger in the Horn of Africa is greed, as leaders 
struggle for power at the expense of the masses. In East Africa, powerful leadership positions are rarely 
acquired through free and fair means. Once acquired, such power is often used to oppress citizens, 
plunder the country’s resources, and corruptly divert foreign aid meant to improve the lives of needy 
people. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of all violent conflicts have taken place in developing 
countries, with African countries accounting for one-quarter of all wars (Nyong’o 1993, Hartung and 
Moix 2000). 
In many cases, the principles of democracy have been ignored for the purpose of seizing power at 
whatever cost, as seen in Rwanda in 1994, Kenya in 2007 and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
2009. Similar situations have arisen at various times in Uganda, Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, the 
Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Clearly, the list is long and ever-growing. The situation in Darfur is one of the 
saddest in the world, as there does not appear to be a solution in sight (IRINa 2008). The likelihood of 
famine increases in poor countries in which warring factions fight; likewise, famines are likely to result in 
wars. 
Notably, none of the world’s countries viewed as having strong commitments to democracy for 
example in North America and in Europe have been prone to famine, whereas most countries with 
repeated famine events can be categorized as “authoritarian,” are ambiguously committed to democracy, 
and/or have some sort of contested sovereignty. Under such circumstances, economic vulnerability 
increases for households caught up in armed struggle, while other households are affected by the erosion 
of the government’s ability to protect vulnerable groups or individuals. In many situations, those meant to 
protect become the perpetrators; this was seen in Kenya in early in 2008 and in the Congo in 2009. UN 
peace soldiers were reported to have sexually abused women and children by trading food for sexual 
favors (Lynch 2004). Unfortunately, conflict -associated problems with food policy and social-service 
provision have tended to receive limited attention until the political outcome is clarified, which can take 
many years, even decades.  
The relationship between famine and war in Africa suggests that we should address the chronic 
and rapidly growing problems of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Kenya, which has a 
population of about 35 million, has a refugee population of more than 0.5 million, putting pressure on an 
already fragile environment (Kenya Red Cross 2007). 
Failed Governance and Policy Vacuums 
The major constraints to citizens’ access to quality food in the East African region include distorted trade 
practices for both external and internal markets, as well as the policy makers’ efforts to keep food security 
issues at the level of rhetoric until a food emergency becomes imminent. These countries have not learned 
from Asia’s Green Revolution, which proved beyond reasonable doubt that any country seeking to 
develop must prioritize access to food, whether homegrown or imported. Perpetual food aid does not help, 
as it tends to distort local food markets. However, food aid to Africa is consistently required to sustain 
various populations, as famine emergencies become more frequent, worsening the status of the acutely 8 
 
food insecure and making their condition chronic. Most countries of the region are subject to both 
political insecurity and natural disasters; in such situations, policies just do not work (Fig. 3). Policies that 
allow for movement of food and livestock and targeting for ration distribution often have run into 
problems where law and order break down due to conflict and food is scarce because of failed harvest In 
2006, more than 3 million Kenyans required food aid to survive in the wake of a major drought affecting 
more than half the country, which was followed by killer floods. In any single year, these adverse 
conditions exist in some part of East Africa. However, even when such events are predicted, droughts and 
floods appear to catch the African governments unawares. The lack of policies aimed at managing these 
types of crises constitutes a major weakness in any country’s food security strategy. 
Effective crisis response requires the coordination of a variety of actors tasked with tackling the 
relevant challenges. In the above case, governments must combine humanitarian and developmental 
actions; this requires both country-level and regional policies aimed at coordinating assistance. At 
present, however, it is often unclear what policies or legal frameworks should inform the handling of both 
acute and protracted emergencies. For many development partners targeting remains a major non-
articulated challenge. In many cases, there are elaborate plans for preventing and mitigating food poverty 
in the region, but these exist only on paper. Each time there is a report of starvation in world news, it is 
almost always in reference to a portion of Africa. In reality, best practices in targeting food aid do not 
apply, with the result that a large proportion of the food aid received by the region is diverted to people 
who need it least, due to corruption (Figure 2).  
Africa is not standing still; like other parts of the world, it is constantly changing. However, it is 
not always clear in which direction is it changing. We need a better definition of the problem, and from 
there we need to formulate policies to effectively address the identified issues. At the moment, “food 
insecurity” is generally translated as “the need for food aid,” meaning that the response comes mainly 
through emergency mechanisms. A quick analysis of responses to food insecurity indicates that most 
assistance requests are directed to food aid, which accounts for the majority of responses to both acute 
needs and reconstruction/development efforts (Benson 2008). It is a sad fact that most of the region’s 
governments best know how to appeal to the international community for food and have done little to 
strategize on how to tackle this perpetual problem.  
Some countries try to use emergency mechanisms to address chronic food insecurity; this is 
problematic, as it is unclear when such mechanisms should intervene, when they should pull out, and 
whom they should target. In this respect, analytical methods should be used to conduct vulnerability 
assessments aimed at precisely distinguishing between households facing a transient problem and those 
that are consistently food insecure, year after year, even when conditions improve. This would help 
address the enormous challenges that surround the targeting of beneficiary households and individuals 
(Benson 2007).  
In Africa, national governments often see emergency food aid as a useful political tool, especially 
around election time. Furthermore, governments may delay food emergency responses in an effort to save 
money, in the expectation that external assistance will soon become available. In any case, governments 
rarely budget for these emergencies, even though they are no longer unpredictable. The governments of 
nations whose citizens are regularly caught up in food emergencies clearly need to become more 
responsible and enact preparedness plans intended to deal with such situations. Indeed, such plans could 
actually increase a country’s economic strength in the long-run, given the huge economic costs of child 
malnutrition (Benson 2008). Many developing countries are unable to effectively monitor and supervise 
relief efforts (including the provision of food). Sometimes the officials charged with distributing relief 
items steal those items for sale or personal use, thereby diverting them from the intended beneficiaries. 
Unfortunately, many governments prefer engaging in humanitarian responses rather than 
investing in long-term development, as the latter has a poor track record in many parts of Africa (albeit 
due mainly to mismanagement and accountability failures). Governments often view shock responses as a 
“donor issue,” raising questions of sovereign responsibility, accountability, and responsibility. However, 
government capacity is still weak, and national governments are rarely the target audience for advocacy 
messages arising from civil society. New policies, legal frameworks and firm guidelines will be required 9 
 
to streamline a sector that now presents major challenges for many sovereign states. All is not lost, 
however. The 2020 Conference for heads of state and top policy makers, which was held in Kampala 
(Uganda) in 2004, stimulated some changes in the way food and nutrition issues are handled by some 
countries, including Uganda (Benson 2008). This goes to show that lobbying, advocacy and presenting 
evidence-based information to policy makers can produce results. 
 
Economic Dimensions 
The eradication of hunger and poverty has proven difficult, even though it has been a stated goal of the 
international development community for more than half a century (Birner 2007). The number of hungry 
people has increased in recent years, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where this parameter has shown 
no real improvement over the past four-plus decades. 
Governance which has been discussed above affects many facets of people’s lives including their 
economic environment.  
As Kofi Annan, the immediate past secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) told world 
leaders in 1998: “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and 
promoting development” (Birner 2007). Governance is the exercise of economic, political, and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. In defining good governance, the UN’s 
Development Programme (UNDP) highlighted participation, accountability, transparency, consensus, 
sustainability, the rule of law, and the inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable people in making 
decisions on the allocation of development resources (Birner 2007). A widely used set of aggregate data 
from a broad range of sources compiled by the World Bank Institute measures the following dimensions 
of good governance: political stability and the absence of violence; the rule of law; voice and 
accountability; regulatory quality; governmental effectiveness and control of corruption; and 
environmental governance (Birner 2007). Each of these dimensions of governance is important for 
eradicating hunger and poverty. Good governance has eluded many African countries, while others have 
shown mixed results. However, although some have exhibited political stability for a considerable period 
of time, these countries have not necessarily met the above-described characteristics. The dimensions of 
governance affect hunger and poverty in numerous ways. 
As our understanding of the complex challenges of development has increased, various 
constraints have been linked to persistent poverty, including adverse weather conditions, the use of 
inappropriate technology, limited capital and education, cultural factors, and institutional/policy failures. 
In analyzing these challenges, governance has recently been identified as a key determinant for the 
success of any nation in poverty reduction efforts.  
Closely associated with bad governance in East Africa are conflict and tribalism both of which 
impede democratic processes. 
Thomas (2004) stated: “believe it or not one would think that the entire continent of Africa is 
engulfed perpetually in armed conflict.” It is true that Africa, despite relatively low press coverage, seems 
to be the most warring region in the world. Nyong’o (1993) states that in 1996 there were 34 states 
engaged in major armed conflict worldwide; 15 of them were located in Africa. It seems likely that such 
conflicts arise over resources and the control over their distribution (Mundt 1990). Western powers have 
engaged in “cold wars;” this has inadvertently affected developing countries, which are forced to take 
sides as their survival comes to depend on their demonstrated support of one superpower over another. 
“Cold wars” have often involved the claiming of regions/countries along with their resources (e.g. land, 
minerals, oil, and/or strategic positioning, thus causing tension and affecting economic progress in a 
negative way. 10 
 
Environmental Dimensions 
A second major unsettling factor in sub-Saharan Africa is its environment (i.e., the ecological character of 
the continent). East Africa has become subject to erratic weather patterns and is often plagued by 
prolonged droughts followed by floods; these natural shocks trigger adverse consequences, including 
widespread food insecurity (GHA 2003). These conditions were previously expected approximately every 
five years; due to climate change, they now seem to be annual events with worsening consequences to 
human life. Climate change on the whole has affected the fragile ecosystems across sub-Saharan Africa, 
negatively impacted farmers, who are often uncertain when to plant, and may lose entire crops to heavy 
rains unexpectedly hitting just as cereals are drying in open fields. Although East Africa has not been hit 
as hard by these events compared to some surrounding areas, the region must of necessity share its 
production with refugees and surrounding, worse-off countries. Millions of sub-Saharan (approximately 
154.3 million inhabitants of the 880 million in sub-Saharan Africa) are subject to harsh living conditions, 
which often precipitate food crises.   
Drought 
Drought is a common phenomenon in East Africa. Most of the region is either arid or semi-arid, often 
going for several seasons in a row without rain. This is devastating for a region that relies mostly on crop 
and livestock agriculture for the livelihoods of its inhabitants. The enduring impacts of the recent five-
year drought will continue to affect the food security situation in East Africa for years to come, making 
the region a food deficit and food aid/importing zone unless drastic mitigation measures are taken. 
Flood 
Floods often follow long-running droughts, exacerbating the deleterious impacts in countries such as 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (especially when rains peak during the long rainy season between April and 
June). The recurrence of flooding is as frequent as that of drought; the negative consequences invariably 
include fatalities, displacement of populations, destruction of farmland, and damage to infrastructure. 
Ironically, the environment is cyclically damaged by severe shortages of water followed by its massive 
overabundance in the absence of a means to harness the rainfall. In the 1950’s, flood mitigation and 
irrigation schemes had been fully developed and were functioning, but apparently stalled soon after the 
country gained its independence in 1963. More recently, flood mitigation schemes have been enacted in 
flood-ravaged areas of Kenya, where donors (e.g., the World Bank) are funding a Five-Year Program in 
the west of the country (Budalangi). 
Tsunami 
The term “tsunami” was foreign to most ordinary Kenyans until December 2004, when a killer wave 
originating off the coast of Indonesia hit the area between Harfun and Garacad in Somalia, also affecting 
the Kenyan coast of Mombasa. The tsunami led to fatalities, destruction of property and infrastructure, 
and disruption to livelihoods, affecting an estimated 44,000 people, 22,000 of whom needed livelihood 
support in the aftermath. Short-term emergency needs (e.g., water, food and medicine) were generously 
donated immediately after the disaster; these donations were successfully delivered despite access 
constraints (OCHA 2005; IRINb 2008). The long-term impacts of the tsunami on the coastal communities 
(e.g., the need to restore livelihoods following the destruction of fishing boats and equipment) are still 
being felt today.  
Due to climate change, it has been predicted (IFPRI/FAO 2008) that drought events will become 
more frequent and virulent in the years to come, meaning that traditional coping strategies will not be 
appropriate or adequate for the task. According to the Impact of Climate Change and Bio-energy on 
Nutrition report prepared jointly by IFPRI and the FAO, developing countries are likely to be hardest hit 
by climate change, with water scarcity becoming an increasing problem. Because the continent of Africa 
is not agro-ecologically homogenous, various regions are likely to experience different types of climate 11 
 
change impacts. Already, changes in food habits, including differences in staple food preparation 
methods, have been attributed to climate change, although the involved populations may not have viewed 
it as such at the time (Devineau et al. 2008). Hulme and colleagues (2000) concluded from a thorough 
review of the literature that Africa’s climate has changed over the last 100 years, but it is not clear to what 
extent this has been brought on by global warming  Other reports have noted the widespread worsening of 
abject poverty and hunger in Africa during this period (Clover 2003).  
As the weather deteriorates and hunger increases, crime and insecurity will increase, because a 
threat to livelihood and wealth is often translated directly into a threat to security and peace. Various 
forms of tension within and between communities can tend to spark violence (Fig. 2). Ethnic and clan 
conflicts are consistently noted as the main causes of unrest in Africa, with blood relations and neighbors 
fighting over water and grazing resources, the stealing of women and livestock, and quarrels over border 
lines. These are possible causes of conflict, especially in situations of scarcity. Tadesse (2003) stated that 
conflict continues to constitute one of the greatest challenges facing the Horn of Africa, while Baro and 
Deubel (2006) wrote of persistent hunger and vulnerability in sub-Saharan Africa. 12 
 
4. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT AND FOOD/NUTRITION 
EMERGENCIES 
Trade in and Possession of Illegal Arms 
Conflicts have many direct and indirect effects on food security, many of which occur far from the 
fighting; these include a long list of obvious results, as well as some not so obvious effects. Livelihoods 
are directly affected in a fairly negative manner. 
The Horn of Africa is rife with illegal arms, and their use leads to needless loss of life. Hundreds 
of people are killed in sporadic and periodic outbursts of violence, while cattle rustling (and attendant 
violence and generalized insecurity) is a perennial problem in the border areas between Kenya and 
Uganda. In an effort to reduce the levels of insecurity in the area, the governments of Kenya and Uganda 
are in the process of jointly implementing a disarmament exercise among their pastoral communities, with 
a focus on their common borders. Neighboring Sudan continues to face serious challenges to sustainable 
stability while violent conflict continues in Darfur (FEWSNET 2008).Kenya is negatively affected by this 
violence because of its porous borders with Sudan (Fig. 1). Economic vulnerability increases for 
households caught up in armed struggle, while other households are affected through the erosion of the 
government’s ability to protect vulnerable populations. Many of the poor fall through the cracks as the 
middle class shrinks and the gap between the poor and rich widens, causing further tensions as the 
majority of citizens are affected by inequities and the unequal distribution of the country’s resources. 
Somalia has not had a government for years and got one put I place only last year. Within one year, on 
June 18, 2009, a suicide attack killed the Somali Minister for Internal Affairs, throwing the country back 
into a state of emergency. As a consequence, more refugees poured across the border into Kenya. 
The Horn of Africa displays all the characteristics of a politically challenged region, with 
insecurity exacerbated by civil/ethnic conflicts, cross-border wars and unregulated armaments of all sorts 
falling into many of the wrong hands (Kingma 1997). Sustainable political stability remains elusive in the 
region. Continuing conflict and incomplete, stalemated and increasingly violent transitions have created 
an uncertain and fluid operating environment, generating tensions between development-focused and 
humanitarian interventions. Regardless, probably the single most important underlying reason for the 
unfortunate conditions faced by the people of Africa lies in the failures of their governments to act. Where 
insecurity prevails, the governmental priorities rarely include feeding or protecting the citizenry. Instead, 
the governments of this region tend to focus on greed-fueled fights for power and supremacy. 
Most of Africa’s recent famines have occurred within the context of armed conflicts. These may 
be wars between countries or civil conflicts within communities. The latter have often been associated 
with challenges to political regimes that show a disregard for civil/human rights and participatory 
governance. In many instances, however, protracted civil conflict arises from territorial protectionism and 
competition over natural resources such as livestock, grazing land, water access, forest land, precious 
stones, and so on. These conflicts are often long-running and precipitate situations of insecurity that 
hamper economic growth and render the involved countries dependent on external support, including food 
aid. Women and children are significantly affected as the men continue to involve themselves in these 
wars. Such situations have occurred with disturbing regularity in Uganda, Rwanda and northern Kenya. 
Civil War and Terrorist Acts 
Historically, conflicts have involved traditional weapons, such as machetes, bows and arrows (IPU 2006). 
More recent fighting, however, has involved use of lethal munitions such as small and medium-sized 
guns, and in some cases, bombs. Consequently, many more individuals are affected by present day 
attacks, with increased numbers of fatalities, maimings, and individuals being rendered unproductive. 
People in the affected areas cannot anticipate any long-term peace, as attacks can come any time. When 
communities are unsettled, residents live in fear and worry about their children, with the result that they 13 
 
cannot be positively productive or establish any sense of permanence. Finding livelihoods in such 
communities becomes a daily hassle, and distrust runs rampant. 
It is very disturbing that sub-Saharan Africa is always at war with itself; this situation bars 
meaningful development even as existing infrastructure and capital is destroyed. The vicious cycle of 
ethnic conflict results in continuous human movement and a paucity of basic needs and services including 
food, shelter, dignity and enjoyment of life. When war and conflict break out, productivity diminishes and 
famine sets in because people are unable to source food. Hadley and Patil (2008) reported symptoms of 
anxiety and depression during seasonal changes in household food insecurity. Communities have 
developed survival and coping strategies that have allowed them to survive over generations but these 
survival skills may not be equal to the threats brought by modern warfare and climate change.  
There are therefore two main scenarios explaining the continuing conflict and war in most of sub-
Saharan Africa: fragile weather and climate change effects, and internal conflicts associated with various 
causes. In these communities, high levels of irritability and tension are likely to easily spark anger and 
fights. The two important overriding challenges common to all countries affected by crises, whether 
natural or manmade, are the increasing number of productive individuals involved in and affected by the 
crisis, and the sense of urgency to minimize mortality in dealing with these situations The situation is 
normally seen as particularly dire when children are involved. All this is fairly unsettling, to say the least, 
and negatively affects most countries, communities and households in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Diminished Response to the Needs of Citizens  
Linking information to better responses is crucial for more appropriate and timely outcomes. Although 
work in this area has gained momentum over time, a great deal still needs to be done. Notably, better 
responses to food insecurity are not just a technical issue; many times stakeholders overlap in their 
functions, compete negatively or fight over limited resources, thereby complicating the task and delaying 
the delivery of services. In many needy countries, databases on the numbers of vulnerable groups 
requiring emergency food are unavailable or highly unreliable. Because resources are limited and 
people’s needs immense, situations usually become dire. 
Information 
It is not possible to act effectively without reliable information. Information systems need not be complex 
or sophisticated (UN2005; SADC 2005). The establishment of evidence-based information systems to 
inform on the scale of food needs have served as a prerequisite for broad and effective interventions in the 
relevant countries. Such systems have further promoted a better understanding of vulnerability issues, 
encouraged the broad participation of numerous stakeholders, provided key information for the 
humanitarian assistance community, and influenced both donor and government policies related to 
emergency and poverty responses.  
Despite some significant successes, however, the link between information systems and policy 
decisions could be enhanced even further. Strong national and regional hunger and vulnerability 
assessment institutions with the potential for generating objective and comprehensive surveillance 
information on emergency responses vs. food security situations should strive to provide leadership in this 
area. To date, the over-riding emergency focus has meant that these institutions are only visible during 
crisis periods. In light of the increasing frequency of emergency situations, these groups should move 
beyond the traditional crisis approach to support a longer-term focus that is more relevant for 
governments and external agencies. Capacity building at the local and regional levels could help make 
experts available to advise political leaders and provide basic information to the beneficiary communities. 
In the 1980’s, Kenya received funding from the Word Bank to train personnel and revamp the Central 
Bureau of Statistics, which is now capable of generating and providing reliable data with the right 
incentives (the issue of personnel incentives lies squarely with the government). Similarly, other 
institutions collate information from many reliable sources and make the data available to all countries in 




In the context of preparedness, it is important to identify who can perform what task best, whether these 
individuals are prepared to do so and what criteria should be used to allocate responsibilities. It is 
generally recognized that chronic food insecurity is not being adequately addressed. In this respect, social 
protection aimed at providing an alternative to emergency food aid, particularly in the form of multi-
annual safety nets, that involves families being able to receive or access a minimum package of support 
for family should be incorporated into the current thinking. For example, using long-term financing from 
government budgets, food crises may be pre-empted or averted by regular transfers of cash and/or food, 
along with and other efforts to strengthen the livelihoods of people facing chronic hunger (OCHA 2005).  
The rationale behind safety nets is that most food shortages in Africa are predictable, as they are 
sparked by adverse weather or conflict. A predictable problem requires a planned response rather than a 
short-term (potentially haphazard) emergency response. The key is to bring national governments to the 
center of efforts to tackle hunger, thereby increasing their accountability and responsibility. Some 
agencies may be understandably skeptical about this emphasis on social protection, while for others, 
social protection is indicative of failed relief requiring humanitarian efforts. However, in some instances it 
may be more accurate to say that the problem is a failure in the way food aid has been used in place of 
longer-term investments. Building resilience requires a more predictable response mechanism and a 
robust move away from actions that are perceived to be failing toward more tangible results-oriented 
responses.  
One of the most convincing arguments in favor of the multi-annual safety net strategy is its cost-
effectiveness for national governments. Currently, many African governments would rather send out 
emergency appeals than initiate emergency response efforts themselves. They virtually expect someone 
else to feed their “hungry children” for them. Few of these governments have the capacity to absorb the 
budgetary requirements of a sudden emergency that requires large operations. Finance ministries are often 
uncomfortable with the distortions that huge relief operations cause in the local markets. However, they 
are generally more interested in economic growth than in setting up social assistance programs for the 
poorest. There is an urgent need for the donor community and governments to continually emphasize the 
synergies between social protection and economic growth, rather than seeing the two as mutually 
exclusive. Building resilience to shocks also means enabling people to increase their productivity and 
engage more actively in development processes. Unfortunately, this thinking has not yet taken root in 
policy discussions in most African countries. But one should ask: Is the whole concept of social safety 
nets a new one? Are there examples of these programs in the industrialized world? For example, how did 
food stamps arise in America? How about unemployment benefits in Europe? Furthermore, are there 
examples of traditional (though perhaps outmoded) food safety systems within African communities?  
Answers to these questions do exist and so one does not have to re-invent the wheel. In the 
industrialized world there are safety nets and traditionally in Kenya there were safety nets to help families 
cope during famine. 
Diminished Capacity to Produce 
It is disturbing that Africa, which needs food so badly, largely fails to employ modern high-yield farming 
methods. Compared to other regions of the world, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa use the least fertilizer 
per hectare of farmland, plant hybrid seeds only rarely, and still utilize rudimentary farm implements. The 
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th Food and Agriculture Regional Conference for Africa came to a close in June 2008 in Nairobi 
without much resolution. This is surprising given that the meeting was being held against a back-drop of 
rapidly escalating food prices, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa region. The underlying resolution 
was that funding for agriculture should be increased to boost production, but many such promises have 
been made in the past without any real change. The conference members also urged that there should be a 
shift from rain-dependent agriculture to irrigation-managed agriculture. There is a good reason for this 15 
 
recommendation: only 7 percent of the continent’s arable land is subjected to irrigated farming. Among 
the African countries, Egypt is exceptional in that it is generally a desert, yet over 80 percent of the 
population is comfortably fed through irrigated agriculture, and there is even some exportable surplus, for 
example the rice that is exported through the COMESA market. How can Egypt enjoy such success when 
other African countries, some boasting better water source systems, complain of being unable to feed 
their people because of drought? Compared to Egypt, Kenya has a larger water mass, more fertile land, 
and less than half the population, yet Kenya imports USD1.3 billion worth of food ( Kenya Times, June 
23, 2008). About 65 percent of Africa’s population is affected by land degradation, with over 80 percent 
of rural inhabitants living in abject poverty as they farm nutrient-depleted soil that is incapable of 
producing enough to feed their families. As rural areas become less and less productive, people migrate to 
mushrooming slums in the urban centers. Clearly, a food shortage catastrophe is on the horizon for the 
urban consumers. Following the FAO Africa Summit Conference, journalist Lumiti Khabuchi headlined 
an article in the Kenya Times (June 23, 2008): “Why African Governments Should Stop Paying Lip 
Service to Food Crisis.”  These governments have, indeed, paid lip service; visionary leaders would 
understand the consequences of not enacting strategies to feed this fast-growing population. 
Increased Disease Burden  
HIV/AIDS is generally accepted as the largest current threat to Africa’s development, in part because it 
affects the continent’s most crucial resource: people. A new type of food crisis has arisen due to 
HIV/AIDS, which has created a new category of highly vulnerable households of people living with who 
have died of HIV/AIDS. Four factors have been identified as explaining the grim projection of recovery 
for these households: interactions between malnutrition and HIV/AIDS; the burden of care; loss of assets 
and skills; and declines in food production (De Waal and Whiteside 2005). In addition to HIV/AIDS, 
malaria has re-emerged in recent years, and now threatens to kill many children. Unfortunately, African 
governments failed to eradicate this menace at a time when DDT was still environmentally acceptable. 
Most countries that successfully eradicated malaria used DDT at the time of eradication, but now oppose 
its use. We can only hope that a vaccine is found soon. The same holds true for tuberculosis. In addition, 
households are negatively affected by non-communicable diseases such as cancer, stroke, cardiovascular 
disease, diabetes, etc., which can affect all segments of society in Africa as these conditions drain 
households of their financial resources that go towards medical treatment of their loved ones. 
The sick are also a resource that can no longer be available to the family. Micronutrient deficiency 
ailments are rampant among the poor in Africa, due to inadequate consumption of foods rich in iron, 
vitamin A and zinc, while protein/energy deficiency stills affects the poor and children in East Africa. 
Thus, people in this region experience multiple burdens of disease, hunger, poverty and malnutrition. 
Analyses point to tribalism as the most potent political force in Africa (Scherrer 2002; Thomas 2004). 
This force is displayed in various forms. In many countries, including Kenya, tribalism is an undercurrent 
that boils over in response to a spark, such as the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya. In some 
countries, tribalism has remained at the “discrimination” level, while in others (e.g., Zimbabwe and 
Sudan) it has emerged as outright violations of human rights. In many African countries, neither 
politicians nor their constituents feel much sense of national identity; rather, politicians often expect to 
(and are expected to) favor members of their own tribes and families.  
Heightening of Ethnic Tensions  
The population of Kenya comprises more than 42 distinctly different tribes, each with its own unique 
language. The language of Swahili arose from Arabic during the days of the slave trade; over time, 
Swahili has spread from slave-trading centers on the Mombasa coast to other parts of the country. In an 
attempt to minimize tribal tension upon gaining independence in 1963, the Kenyan government declared 
Swahili as the medium of communication. However, it took more than 40 years for all primary schools 
countrywide to teach Swahili; the present generation of school-going youngsters is fluent in the language. 16 
 
As Swahili has been universalized, the vernacular languages have increasingly been phased out of the 
schools. However, most Kenyans remain fairly rural, with their mother tongue as their first language and 
tribal culture firmly entrenched during childhood. Early efforts aimed at encouraging Kenyans to develop 
a sense of nationhood stalled in the decades following independence; today, very strong tribal undertones 
threaten the country’s development. Over 80 percent of all Kenyans are rural based (Omosa and 
McCormick 2004). Official figures released in January 2007 estimated the population of Kenya at 36.1 
million in 2006 (GoK 2007). 
Kenyans are typically rural-based, and are entrenched in their tribal ways from birth until early 
adulthood, when they might get a chance to socialize with people from other tribes. Sentiments against 
other tribes start building up slowly and become solidified through the media (e.g., through radio reports 
and politicians’ speeches). With the liberalization of the media at the turn of the 21
st century 2000, a 
number of vernacular radio stations emerged; during the 2008 post-election violence they were used to 
pass hate messages. Unfortunately, there has been no national ethos to promote Kenyan unity and 
discourage discrimination based on tribal differences. Politicians (and even some parents) unfortunately 
capitalize on this whenever it suits them. It is no wonder that by the time of the 2007 elections (and at 
similar times previously), it was not difficult to find Kenyans who hated members of other tribes, even 
though they had never met or interacted with members of those tribes. Hate for other tribes is entrenched 
through indoctrination and manipulation. This was the recipe for the post-election violence of 2008 
(following the 2007 elections), which left hundreds of thousands of Kenyans displaced and without food. 
Notably, however, some analysts including the author have suggested that ethnicity was just an excuse, 
with the underlying cause of the violence resting with issues of inequity and historical injustices that have 
gone uncorrected for decades. 
Thomas (2004) stated that: “most Africans are not mere ethnics who wear funny hats and eat 
indigestible food on the national day of their old country. They are proud tribes’ people. They honor their 
ancestors, respect traditional customs and have a strong sense of solidarity with fellow members of their 
tribe. Yet any mention by outside commentators of tribalism in twenty-first century Africa is taboo, 
unless it is a mocking reference to the 'white tribe' which dominated the continent's southern tip during 
the apartheid era.” 
Robert Guest (2006), in his book The Shackled Continent, wrote: “Most Africans feel more 
loyalty to their tribe than to the young nation-states of which they are citizens.” 
A number of theories have been proposed to explain why most Africans feel more tribal than 
national, including an aversion to any outsider who mentions tribalism, borders drawn arbitrarily by 
imperial masters, and the separation or forced blending of tribes based on these false divisions. The 
colonial powers capitalized on tribal differences by applying the “divide and rule” strategy that has 
persisted into present day governance styles. African politicians frequently use such methods to 
disorganize communities, fuel tensions, and play favorites as a means to sustain their grip on power. This 
tends to increase inter- and intra-community divisions and tensions. However, all proposals to redraw the 
tribal lines have been universally resisted (even by the UN) since it is feared such a move might fuel more 
violence than it solves (Thomas 2004). More on Kenya’s post-election violence in 2008 can be found in 
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 
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5.  FOOD EMERGENCIES: RESPONSES AND MITIGATION  
Whatever the cause of a food emergency, a response is required. 
Responses to Food Emergencies  
Drought, floods, erratic weather conditions, water source pollution, and sudden threats to physical 
security can all spark major food and nutrition emergencies. Although armed conflict is frequent, it is not 
something people get used to; sudden fighting or raids can cause panic and drive people away from their 
productive areas. This again can spark a food emergency. Because many African economies are weak, 
relying mostly on agriculture even in agriculturally weak areas, seasonal crop failure can also lead to a 
food crisis.  
Food aid is a major component of any type of response to a food crisis, in both the short and long 
terms. A great deal has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of food aid. In this paper, we 
shall give only some highlights. The region under discussion receives considerable quantities of food aid 
from a number of “well-to-do” countries. However, most often this food aid comes as an emergency 
response and stops as soon as the crisis-associated deaths trail off. The UN’s World Food Program (WFP) 
and the Red Cross are among the organizations that mobilize food aid. The demand for food aid seems to 
have increased as more conflict areas are reported (OCHA 2004; OCHA 2005; UN 2008). 
On the smaller scale, communities have traditionally had their own response mechanisms to 
crises, especially where food shortages are common and may be anticipated. However, while historical 
conflicts involved spears and knives, modern attacks involve guns and may kill many more members of a 
village, especially the men all at once. In cases of hunger weather-related crop failure, pastoralists might 
move in search of water and greener pastures for their livestock, while farmers might plant drought-
resistant crops (as required by many governments).  
Giles (2007) wrote that African communities have been adapting to climate change for millennia. 
For example, in El Fasher, an impoverished state capital in western Sudan, rural people used to rely on 
weak rains to raise crops in sandy soils. However, the region’s rainfall had been below average since the 
turn of the 20
th century.  In response to this climate change, a million people have vanished from the 
region (either through migration or death) and community coping strategies have broken down. 
Long-Term Strategies for Mitigation  
Although disasters should ideally be prevented, this is not always possible. Therefore, governments and 
communities should have mitigation and preparedness measures in place, in the hopes of minimizing the 
negative impacts of any eventuality.  
Publicity 
When disasters receive publicity in the media, important organizations such as the UN are likely to take 
notice and facilitate positive responses from around the world. By the time the news breaks globally, 
however, local areas have typically sustained horrendous damage and fatalities, and hunger is often 
rampant due to the lack of internal mechanisms to deal with the crisis. By the time resources are 
mobilized, the affected communities have sustained gaping wounds that will need time to heal. Thus, 
peace restoration and reconstruction takes much longer than it would have if the issue had been publicized 
(and a response triggered) earlier. 
The most highly publicized type of natural disaster is Africa is undoubtedly drought, which is 
often followed by terrible flooding. In declaring 10 October as the International Day for Natural Disaster 
Reduction, the UN recognized flooding as one of the most frequent and widespread environmental 
hazards. According to the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, between 18 
 
1993 and 2002, flood disasters “affected more people across the globe - 140 million per year on average - 
than all the other natural or technological disasters put together.”(IFRC 2002).  
The UK Environment Agency and the UK-based Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research 
also recognized that floods cause more damage than any other natural disaster (TCCCR 2009). Huge 
annual losses result from flood-induced disruptions to economic livelihoods, businesses, infrastructure, 
services and public health. In developing countries, where infrastructure is often weak, flooding can cause 
major difficulties and significantly delay development. 
Beyond the immediate physical threat of the floodwaters, there are numerous longer-term health 
risks. For example, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), flooding can increase exposure 
to toxins and pathogens, affect mental health, and disrupt the capacity of healthcare systems to respond to 
health crises (FEWS NET 2006). These events need to be publicized, as they have become global events. 
Furthermore, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2000) predicts that climate 
change is likely to intensify flooding hazards in many areas of the world. Although the available 
computer models cannot yet definitively predict where, when, or by how much flood hazards will change, 
specialists suggest that existing flood-prone locations and some coastal and river-basin areas will become 
more vulnerable to severe flooding in the years to come. Thus, there is need for more concerted action to 
better prepare populations for the negative impact of climate change. The world is facing a new 
responsibility to protect the most vulnerable populations from floods and other weather-related disasters. 
The IPCC further recognizes that flooding risks are shaped as much by social as by natural forces. To 
quote the IPCC: “Poor communities may therefore be particularly vulnerable, especially when 
concentrated in high-risk and often environmentally degraded areas” (FEWSNET 2006, 2009). 
In sum, publicity is a crucial part of the food emergency response, even for governments. 
Publicity can not only alert a government to a problem, it can also act as a tool through which the 
government can reach out for international relief and other forms of external assistance. 
Sharing Best Practices  
Knowledge transfer is a good means for tackling crises, since it means that responders are not required to 
“re-invent the wheel.” There is plenty of existing knowledge on the management of crisis impacts, albeit 
outside the African continent. This knowledge needs to be shared and used to reduce the suffering of 
people in crisis. In the context of flood management, a good example can be seen in the case of 
Bangladesh, where an effective early warning system called the Flood Forecasting and Warning System 
(FFWS) has been put into place along with other mitigation measures, such as appropriate land-planning 
strategies, mapping of high-risk areas, improvement of legislation to control flood-plain development, and 
high population awareness and preparedness. This has reduced the impact of floods in Bangladesh, 
although recent reports suggest there is still room for improvement. With the world media focusing on the 
potential effects and importance of climate change, experts argue that it is important to educate at-risk 
populations and communicate flood mitigation strategies as widely as possible (FEWSNET 2006; 
RCMRD 2006; LEWS/GLCRSP 2006). 
Small Measures can Help Prevent Catastrophic Outcomes  
Even small measures can be effective in saving lives. In the absence of adaptation measures, flood risks 
are exacerbated. Although this is considered particularly relevant to developing countries, the devastation 
wrought in the USA by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was a reminder that even the most developed nations 
must actively work to protect their citizens against natural disasters. With the prospect of worsening 
weather patterns and disaster events in the near future, all nations should seek to modernize their 
mitigation and coping strategies.  
Experts have long recommended that disaster-risk reduction must be successfully incorporated 
into broader sustainable development goals aimed at fostering more resilient communities. There are 
signs that governments worldwide, including that of Uganda, are recognizing the increasing threat of 
natural disasters and beginning to take action individually and regionally. In November 2006, government 19 
 
representatives and experts met in Nairobi Kenya to design a five-year disaster reduction program. The 
ISDR and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change partnered in this initiative to help reduce 
future flood losses. Other African governments have committed to the implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (2005-2015), and are also adopting measures to reduce the impacts of floods. For 
example, the Ugandan government's multi-sectoral Department of Disaster Management and Refugees 
has created, with support from the ISDR, a national platform to plan and implement coordinated 
mitigation and response initiatives in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Lessons 
learned from each crisis must be analyzed and acted upon in order for future floods to remain natural 
events and not evolve into major human disasters. Information arising out of such analyses should then be 
shared with countries that face similar vulnerabilities (FEWSNET 2006; RCMRD 2006; LEWS/GLCRSP 
2006). 
Facilitating Social Dialogue 
Communication is a necessary step towards conflict management. Crisis prevention, which is an 
important part of managing conflicts and social crises in particular, greatly benefits from social dialog, 
strong social partners, and their active participation in the process of defining and enacting policies. Such 
crises rarely hit countries that have a structure and tradition of social dialog, as these mechanisms provide 
avenues for citizens to share their ideas and channel their grievances. Social dialog is also a main 
indicator of good governance, even at the community level (OCHA 2005b). Most crises, such as those 
occurring during socio-political transitions, expose problems in governance, institutional paucity, and 
failures to follow democratic principles. Government and civil society dialog is therefore essential to the 
achievement of long-lasting political stability and peace. Talking out issues usually helps dampen tempers 
and sometimes even yields a solution. 
Supporting Entry into Gainful Employment  
Entry into gainful employment is easier to realize in a peaceful and stable environment. Employment 
creation is a major challenge for many countries, particularly those in the Horn of Africa, where many 
people rely on farm incomes yet increasingly fewer people can truly be called real farmers. In these 
countries, employment-promoting activities need to have short-term objectives, such as job creation and 
income generation (e.g., through micro-businesses), and these objectives need to be congruent with the 
country’s medium- and long-term goals. Obviously, this can only be achieved if all the concerned stake-
holders and constituents are involved in defining policies.  20 
 
6.  THE WAY FORWARD 
Africa is culturally, economically, and politically varied, engendering complex challenges that require the 
attention of a concerted and united front. Unfortunately, although some attempts are being made at the 
African Union level, Africa cannot boast of ever having acted in unison. This section summarizes the 
various actors and emphasizes the areas that will need to be improved if we hope to correct the situation 
in East Africa. 
Governments 
The role of the government in all matters affecting the citizenry cannot be over-emphasized. The 
international press consistently presents pictures of African women, children, sick and elderly either on 
the move in search of refuge or emaciated and scrambling for food and water. These unpleasant pictures 
evoke sympathy and trigger frantic fundraising efforts by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with 
funds often coming from ordinary taxpayers across the industrialized world. Unfortunately, this funding is 
unlikely to continue as the worldwide economy (including the economies of traditional donor countries) 
faces the worst financial downturn in over six decades and suffers the associated losses of jobs and 
homes. 
Therefore, African governments should initiate comprehensive studies aimed at exploring the 
policy and economic dimensions of a food/nutrition crisis. All attempts to act in an ad hoc manner should 
be avoided. Furthermore, attempts should be made to strengthen the existing emergency structures, in the 
hopes of improving each country’s capacity to mitigate crises. The governments should facilitate 
vulnerability assessments in an effort to identify the areas and socioeconomic groups that are most in need 
of food aid, in the hopes of improving the overall efficiency of emergency responses. As a strategy to 
attract more donor assistance, countries should seek to create a domestic environment that facilitates the 
work of humanitarian organizations. At present, existing policies are sometimes ignored with impunity by 
corrupt leaders. 
Existing assessments indicate that in some regions and instances, food and nutrition insecurity 
crises are as much general crises of livelihoods or development as opposed to simple food shocks. This is 
attributed to the failure of governments to understand and adequately address their citizens’ increasing 
vulnerability to changing political and socioeconomic environments. Due to this failure, even a modest 
external threat (e.g., erratic rainfall) can be sufficient to trigger widespread suffering. The complexity of 
such crises, which are now recognized as having both acute and chronic dimensions, cannot be 
underestimated. This implies that future investigation should focus not just on food availability, but rather 
on developing a broader understanding of the relevant risks and vulnerabilities, including the roles of 
access and entitlement in food insecurity (Tibbo 2006).  
Governments should create a forum where all constituents involved in crisis response can 
communicate their activities and approaches, and discuss how to improve the effectiveness of their 
response strategies vis-à-vis the crises of the present and future. Such forums would provide a unique 
consultative process that may help governments refine their strategies and programs, and could be used as 
a source of relevant recommendations for and impact analyses of crisis-response mechanisms in different 
contexts.  
The International Community 
The MDGs are a set of ambitious goals drafted by the United Nations in 2000, with the aim of helping 
developing countries increase their education levels, reduce their poverty levels, and improve the health 
situations of their poor. The MDGs are to be achieved by 2015, but many African countries are unlikely 
to reach the stated benchmarks by this time. It is often argued that Africa's slow growth is associated with 
political instability and bad policy outcomes such as low education levels, underdeveloped financial 
systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and inadequate infrastructure. The 21 
 
policy records of countries in Africa contrast sharply with those in more successful economies, notably 
those in East Asia. We must therefore ask ourselves: Should the African governments leave it to the UN 
alone to set targets? Could the governments develop effective, self-initiated collaborations aimed at 
exchanging ideas and sharing good practices? Although it is likely that such efforts are ongoing, they are 
not yet occurring on a large enough scale to make a difference. 
In the 1960’s, the FAO and other development agencies (e.g., Oxfam) initiated the Freedom from 
Hunger Campaign, which was the first attempt to address the problem of food insecurity through more 
than just food aid. The campaign set out to involve developing countries in analyzing the causes of food 
crises and malnutrition, and to find sustainable solutions. In short, the campaign sought to enable people 
to grow or earn enough to feed themselves (Oxfam 2006; Benson 2007).  
Nearly five decades later, however, that worthy intention has not been fulfilled in all parts of the 
world. While conditions vary greatly across Africa, 33 percent of sub-Saharan Africans are 
undernourished compared with 17 percent of people in developing countries as a whole. The proportion is 
even worse in some countries, rising to 55 percent in Central Africa (Oxfam 2006).  The average number 
of food emergencies in Africa per year has almost tripled since the mid 1980’s. With regard to the MDGs, 
at the current rates of progress, most African countries will not be able to halve the number of hungry by 
the 2015 deadline. These failures stem in part from the fact that emergency aid (and food aid in particular) 
has remained the chief instrument through which external agents address food crises. Although food aid 
saves lives, it does not offer long-term solutions, and may even exacerbate food insecurity. These 
challenges are commonly accepted, yet spending on humanitarian aid has risen substantially over time 
while aid for agricultural production and research in sub-Saharan Africa dropped by 43 percent between 
1990-92 and 2000-02. Worse, neither the African administrations nor the first world governments have 
done enough to tackle the root causes of hunger. We must now face the fact that we are dealing with food 
crises in Africa that may, in part, be blamed on the inadequacies of our responses to earlier crises.  
In terms of mitigation, some of the causes of the current devastating food emergencies facing 
Africa could not have been foreseen 46 years ago. For example, HIV/AIDS is exacting a terrifying toll on 
one of Africa’s key resources for food production: human capital. By 2020, a fifth of the agricultural 
workforce in the southern African countries will have been claimed by AIDS. Climate change is another 
unprecedented threat to food security. This will particularly affect the most vulnerable sections of the 
population, namely the smallholders and nomadic pastoralists that rely on rain-fed agriculture. 
Researchers have credibly predicted that 55 to 65 million more Africans will be at risk of hunger by the 
2080’s, as a result of a global temperature rise of less than 2.5°C. Most striking, however, is the deadly 
impact of Africa’s conflicts, which have caused more than half of the continent’s food crises in recent 
years. In every country that has suffered a prolonged food emergency, war or civil strife has played a 
major part in the crisis. Although African governments have a responsibility to protect their populations, 
they persistently fail to do so (as in northern Uganda) or are even complicit in the violence (as in Darfur).  
According to the FAO, the proportion of human-induced food emergencies has more than 
doubled over the past 14 years. But what humans have broken, humans can mend. Oxfam firmly believes 
that the hunger and starvation seen in much of Africa in this first decade of the 21st century may be 
inevitable, but are clearly morally unacceptable. Many policies that have distorted world trade to the 
disadvantage of sub-Saharan Africa are externally driven, meaning that the international community must 
fix the wrongs. Greater external assistance is needed, potentially financed from the recent G8 
commitments to increase development aid and debt relief (Reuters 2009). An important lesson from the 
flawed market reforms introduced in the 1980’s by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (and backed by major donors) is that rural markets on their own cannot deliver food security. 
International NGOs (e.g., the Red Cross, CARE, OXFAM, Save the Children and others) can be 
useful in the management of different types of humanitarian disaster. Such organizations often have the 
expert personnel needed for quick responses. They also have a credibility that enables them to quickly 
raise resources from across the world. Some of this capacity and resources should be transferred to local 
NGOs that are closer to the problem areas. Furthermore, there is a need for increased transparency in the 
disbursement of resources by these groups.  22 
 
Thus, there is considerable scope for effective international action, even in the presence of violent 
conflicts in famine-prone countries. The foundation to forestall famine under non-war conditions must be 
laid early on, and in some cases, famine-prevention policies may serve to prevent war. In the future, 
famine prevention should be based on recognizing the boundaries of human suffering rather than the 
boundaries defined by politics and geography.  
The Private Sector 
The private sector is assuming an increasingly important role in the social sector, often due to pressure to 
“give back” to those who make their businesses succeed. Donor agencies and governments who are 
committed to improving service delivery to their citizens are keen to use the private sector’s efficient 
networks for this purpose. 
Notably, agents in the private sector ultimately want to make money, so they might ask: How are 
we supposed to make money from people who are hungry, poor and sick? These agents must be reminded 
of their social responsibility, but they should also look at the long-term benefits of early investment in 
services that will lead populations towards sound health. Given the events of the recent past, when 
irresponsible behavior and lack of regulation among big corporations and the banking sector caused 
billions of people across the world to lose their life savings, it may take some time before the private 
sector can truly be considered an example of good practice. However, going forward, it could be hoped 
that the public sector may learn a great deal from the way private sector carries out its business. Due 
recognition of some private sector partners may cause less generous development players to apply some 
best practices. Indeed, working in a complementary manner appears to be bearing fruit in some quarters 
as is the case now between private sector and public and civil society sectors in addressing micronutrient 
deficiencies.  23 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The recent food shortage that has affected many communities across the globe has caused many hungry 
people to angrily demonstrate against the scarcity of essential commodities and increases in consumer 
prices, particularly for staple foods. This region was a net exporter of food in the 1970’s (Kirwan et al. 
2007), but now suffers from perpetual food shortage crises. Responses have often come from outside the 
region, but this aid has typically addressed the area’s acute hunger without dealing with the long-term 
impacts on health and nutrition. These emergency responses often focus on managing the emergency and 
the immediate recovery efforts, but once the situation calms and the news quickly fades from the 
international radar screen, little attention is paid. Reconstruction efforts are therefore often shorted, 
because by the time deaths from one emergency have tapered off, another emergency in another part of 
the world has claimed the attention of the relief community.  
Therefore, the responsibility must perforce be taken up by the governments of the affected 
countries. They can seek outside assistance from Africa’s many friends in the international community. 
But like the owner of a burning house, concerned governments must first and foremost protect their own 
(e.g., against human rights abuses, etc.). Furthermore, governments must facilitate decent and affordable 
housing for the majority, ensure justice for all, protect the environment for current and future generations, 
protect relevant societal and cultural values while observing and adhering to acceptable international 
norms, and where possible provide for the enjoyment of life by citizens. However, such enjoyment is 
impossible when the majority of citizens do not know where their next meal is going to come from or 
how to get treatment when they are sick. In most African countries, including Kenya, leaders are 
preoccupied with getting and maintaining power at any cost. Unfortunately, once a leader attains a 
position of power, he can often do whatever he wants without being questioned. 
At present, there is probably need to form the equivalent of the International Criminal Court 
within the social sector, with the goal of creating certain minimum standards that governments must meet. 
Such a mechanism should aim at preventing mass suffering; unfortunately, it may be difficult to prevent 
the suffering of a few, particularly at the start of a crisis. Currently, the international community takes far 
too long to respond to crises, and the mandate of UN peace-keepers seems pointless if they cannot prevent 
atrocities, despite their numbers and armaments. Given that about 17,000 UN peacekeepers recently came 
under fire in the Congo, and were unable to protect the people they had been sent to help, it would seem 
to be time to review these rules and mandates. 
Major efforts are needed to improve the quality of government intervention in food emergency 
situations, which is too often dogged by corruption and a lack of capacity. Moreover, donor institutions 
such as the World Bank are rightly accused of having fallen short of their own declared standards in 
failing to enforce conditions that would ensure proper use and full accountability of loans and aid. 
Governments and donors must ensure that resources are translated into concrete benefits for Africa’s poor 
and hungry. This will require that local civil society organizations step up to play major roles in 
monitoring aid flows and speaking out when things go wrong. To ignore such issues is to betray the 
hungry of Africa. Industrialized countries must also do much more to ensure that unjust international 
trade rules do not destroy rural livelihoods. They must act to stabilize the volatile commodity prices that 
create terrible hardship for African producers. The rich-country trading blocs must stop forcing open 
African markets for their own benefit, and end the dumping of their subsidized farm produce. In the past 
three decades, Africans have benefited from an increasing awareness of freedom, better education, and a 
heightened understanding of why it was important to struggle for independence. However, citizens in a 
number of African countries most likely feel worse off now than they did prior to before independence. 
At the end of the day, everyone has a responsibility to get Africa as a whole, and East Africa in 
particular, back on track. 24 
 
8. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Modern information and communications technology should be fully employed to improve 
communication and dialog in the region and to enhance trade. Information,  communications 
and technology (ICT) should prove to be a cheap and efficient means of bridging the digital 
divide between the rich and the poor. 
2.  National budgets should include funds for food assistance and other resources aimed at 
assisting vulnerable groups, such as children and those who are HIV/AIDS affected, and 
helping households boost small-scale food production. The government must help manage 
security and monitor the costs of inputs to ensure the success of small-scale farmers, who are 
the main food producers in East Africa. Given that local coping systems seem to have 
disintegrated, it will also be crucial to facilitate the building of longer-term resilience by 
instituting social protection systems. 
3.  There are currently too many players addressing the various food crises in Africa, including 
the AU/NEPAD**, which has been helping governments develop longer-term strategies for 
addressing high food prices, and the WFP, which is involved at both the regional and national 
levels. However, there is little coordination among the various groups, and it is difficult to 
measure the overall impact or the respective impacts of the various players. In the future, it 
will be important to coordinate and assess these groups, and key decision makers should be 
updated regularly as each situation evolves.  
4.  All generated information and proposed responses must be consistent with the 
Comprehensive Framework for Action prepared by the High Level Task Force on the Global 
Food Crisis established by the UN Secretary General (UNS 2008). Key decision makers must 
be encouraged (or perhaps forced) to take timely action upon receipt of early warning 
information, which is typically available three months ahead of the predicted events.  
**AU=Africa Union; NEPAD=New Partnership for African Development 
5.  National policy processes tend to treat under-nutrition as a business-as-usual issue. There is 
no drama associated with this pervasive problem, which is not perceived as being critical to 
the country’s future, the government’s continued political success, or the well-being of 
citizens. As a consequence, there is low political demand for action against under-nutrition, 
and most governments in sub-Saharan Africa do very little to ensure that nutrition-related 
goods and services are provided to their citizens (Benson 2008).  
6.  Regional organizations and other peace-keeping entities (including development partners) 
should strive to ensure political stability and the absence of violence. A stable environment is 
a fundamental precondition for food security and development.  
7.  Governments should ensure adequate access by the poor and disadvantaged groups, 
especially the rural poor and women, to justice and the rule of law t avoid acts of desperation 
and violence. 
8.  Everyone needs to feel they can be heard and get their issues resolved. A country’s citizens 
should be able to participate in selecting their government in a free, fair and nonviolent way. 
Citizens need to be assured of their leaders’ accountability, their own freedoms of expression 
and association, and a free media.  
9.  Ensuring equity is part of good governance. Where policies fail to ensure fair play and 
equitable distribution of national resources, those who are negatively affected tend to respond 
in ways that can disturb the public peace. Policies should be implemented with the aim of 
decreasing plundering (corruption) by public officials. 
10. Environmental governance is a fairly new concept that is nonetheless critical. Because the 
poorest people depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, special attention should be paid to 25 
 
the management of natural resources (e.g., water, soil, range lands, and forests), in an effort 
to ensure that hunger and poverty reduction strategies are sustainable in the long run. The 
best way to achieve such goals is to involve the relevant communities in the dialogue. 26 
 
9.  APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Kenya 
Famed for its wildlife, natural beauty and prehistoric sites, Kenya was under British control from 1895 
until the country gained independence in 1963. The population of Kenya is diverse, comprising more than 
40 ethnic groups. In the recent past, terrorism, banditry, cross-border raids, cattle rustling and instability 
caused by crises in neighboring Somalia and Sudan have threatened the peace and security in Kenya. The 
WFP classifies Kenya as a low-income, food-deficit country (IRINa 2008). Vulnerability to drought and 
food shortage is widespread in the arid and semi-arid districts of the country’s northern, coastal and 
eastern areas. Endemic poverty, low productivity from the drought-prone arid and semi-arid lands, and 
high population growth have all contributed to increasing hunger. The country is also flood-prone, with 
devastating floods often following crippling drought. Food insecurity is highest in urban slums, and 
among pastoralists and marginal agriculturalists in the remote arid and semi-arid lands that comprise 80 
percent of Kenya's land mass. Although the latest information reveals that HIV/AIDS is now under 
control, with the number of new infections decreasing, the disease is another risk to food security as it has 
taken a heavy toll on the productive workforce. The WFP offers a School Feeding Programme in Kenya, 
providing food to children in drought-prone areas.  
Kenya was the scene of one of the most intense emergency situations in the recent past. Just 
before the general elections held on 26 December 2007, The Economist magazine (7 June 2007) described 
Kenya as an African success story, with unprecedented economic growth over the five-year 
administration of the incumbent, President Kibaki. This was in contrast to the tenure of Kibaki’s 
predecessor, Moi, who governed for 24 years amidst accusations of corruption, incompetence and 
nepotism. In fairness, Moi’s first ten years in office had fairly good indicators. He overstayed, however, 
and the latter 14 years of his tenure negated the early positive outcomes. By the time he left office in 
2003, the economy had virtually ground to a halt, with economic growth below 1 percent annually. At the 
end of Kibaki’s first five-year term in 2007, annual economic growth was estimated at 7 percent. Kenya is 
geo-politically strategic, with the seaport of Mombasa serving as the nearest major sea access point for a 
number of landlocked countries in the region, including Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. These countries 
depend on the port of Mombasa and a sizeable portion of Kenya’s road transport system to service their 
economies  
As of 2002, although civil conflict had become the norm in the Greater Horn of Africa, Kenya 
was described as an island of peace in the conflict-troubled region. This changed abruptly and 
unexpectedly when violence erupted in Kenya in early 2008. Despite the country’s reputation for relative 
peace, Kenya’s elections are anything but free and fair. Kenyan women running for parliament are in 
danger of being raped (Hunt 2007) and Kenyan officials are known to be corrupt and to misappropriate 
public funds with impunity (Githongo 2008). There is typically violence every time a general election is 
held, but no prior skirmish had reached the scale of the violence seen in early 2008. Ndungu (2008) 
reported more than 1500 women rape victims, with cases of gang and sibling raping all occurring during 
the last election. Osborne (2008) stated that businesses and shops were burnt to the ground and many 
women and young girls were raped during the violence. The main perpetrators of this violence were 
individuals who were apparently convinced that only a member of the Kikuyu tribe (one of the major 
tribes) was capable of leading Kenya.  
Documentation of what happened has revealed that the violence was actually planned early in 
2007 and that explains the violence that accompanied nominations even before the elections themselves 
(KCHR 2008). It appears that some people were prepared to start violence once the results were 
announced, regardless of how they turned out. Through text messages, a huge number of Kenyans had 
been alerted by their various supporters as to what to do. As the presidential results were being 
announced, violence erupted in most parts of Kenya. 
At some stage it appeared as if no one was in charge especially before the current President was 
controversially and hurriedly sworn in and a government put in place. Once in place most political leaders 27 
 
the AUTHOR talked to believe the violence would be short lived and dismissed calls to bring I n the 
Kenyan Army as had been the case in the 1982 abortive coup. Violence escalated instead of relenting, 
people were massacred and it had to take the intervention of the international community to bring matters 
to cool down (UNICEF 2008). 
The 2008 political violence severely undermined food security, especially in areas regarded as the 
grain basket of the country (e.g., the Rift Valley), where a large number of people were displaced at a 
time when they should have been preparing their land for planting. Violence chased farmers and their 
families away from their farms and into camps, with the result that more than two thirds of farm land was 
left uncultivated. Furthermore, fertilizer prices skyrocketed and transportation of government-subsidized 
fertilizer from the port of Mombasa was delayed, meaning that the relatively small amount of cultivated 
land was planted without fertilizer (IRINa 2008).  
For decades, Kenya has been home to refugees from neighboring countries. In 2008, it had to 
manage its own “refugees.” Catering for the more than half-million internally displaced persons in terms 
of shelter, food, security and other basic needs has proven to be a daunting challenge. 
Appendix 2: Rwanda and Burundi  
Rwanda and Burundi are two hilly countries that are extremely beautiful but densely populated. These 
countries have histories of statehood and hierarchical social structures stretching back 400-700 years. The 
populations of the two countries are very similar in composition, with the Hutu (Bahutu) comprising a 
large majority. According to a colonial anthropology of the 19th century (PPU 1994), the Hutu are Bantu 
people who emigrated from Cameroon and traveled eastward to Kenya and southward to the Cape, 
populating approximately one-third of Africa’s surface. The Hutu, like most Bantu, have their work in 
agriculture. In contrast, the Tutsi (Batutsi), who according to colonial anthropology came from northeast 
Africa, are Nilo-Cushitic and mostly work as cattle breeders. It is said that in the pre-colonial days, 
population groups were always moving in search of food and peace (PPU 1994). 
 





PPU( 1994) noted that there was tension in Rwanda between 1961 and 1966 as Tutsis living 
outside the country attempted several times to topple the government of Rwanda. Each time they did this, 
Hutus inside the country retaliated by massacring the Tutsis living inside Rwanda. By December 1963, 
14,000 were dead and tens of thousands of Tutsis had fled the country. In 1966, the policy of “ethnic” 
discrimination against the Tutsi was pursued in the same manner as an earlier colonial policy directed 
against the Hutu. The Hutu were hitting back. 
Appendix 2, Figure 1.  Bones of massacred Tutsis 
 
Source: PPU 1994, London 
 
The military in neighboring Burundi was Tutsi-dominated from 1966 to 1991, with the Hutu 
majority lacking representation in the military and remaining under-represented in politics. In 1972 a 
state-organized, selective genocide was carried out by the army against tens of thousands of Hutu and 
opposition Tutsi. Between 100,000 and 200,000 people are estimated to have died beginning at the end of 
April 1972. This followed agitation by Hutu extremists among Barundi refugees in Tanzania, and a Hutu 
rebellion in the south. Within days, educated Hutu évolués and Tutsi dissidents had been rounded up and 
murdered by the army. Évolué is a French term (literally, evolved or developed) used in the colonial era to 
refer to native Africans who had "evolved" through education or assimilation and accepted European 
values and patterns of behavior. Évolués spoke French, followed French laws, usually held white-collar 
jobs (although rarely higher than clerks), and lived primarily in urban areas. Such individuals were seen 
as the desired end product of France's assimilation policy. Évolués were treated as an elite and privileged 
group by the colonial administrators” (Delancey et al. 2000). 
Thereafter, the Hutu in Burundi were described as a “lost generation” bound together by their 
hatred for the Tutsi, who remained in power and discriminated against the Hutu. Until the 1990s, the 
intellectual and leadership class consisted almost exclusively of Tutsis. Under the eleven-year Bagaza 
regime (1976-1987), there were no further massacres, but there was also no sharing of power. All 
provincial governors and most civil servants, judges, and teachers were Tutsi. The same was true in 
Rwanda, but in this case the Hutus were in power. In 1984, the tension came to a head as the Hutus 
massacred close to a million Tutsis before the international community stepped in. Fifteen years later, 
suspects are still in jail awaiting trial while judiciaries seek to close loopholes that would allow them to 
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